

SECURITY IN THE BALTIC STATES

by

MALBONE W. GRAHAM

with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

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[On February 6, 1932 the Lithuanian government seized Herr Otto Boettcher, the President of Memel Territory—an area populated by Germans whose autonomy is guaranteed by a League statute of 1924—and proceeded to establish complete control over the city. The reason given for this seizure was that the President had carried on clandestine negotiations with Germany. The German government at once asked the League Council to protect the Memel statute and restore the *status quo*. If Lithuania should succeed in absorbing Memel, Poland, it is feared, will attempt to do likewise in the case of Danzig. In view of these developments, the appearance of Professor Graham's report is of especial timeliness.—ED.]

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IN a previous report,¹ dealing with internal politics in the countries constituting the new Balticum,² it was noted that the problem of security would receive separate treatment. In approach and method this study differs necessarily from the evaluation of a complex internal situation born of the intricacies of social structure, cultural heritage and prevalent political climate. Security is not an analytic but a synthetic concept, and must be viewed as the product of the different geographic, political and diplomatic factors involved in the maintenance of the international position of each state and its integration into the life of the international community. Security is, then, something more than an accumulation of stabilities. Only as there is conscious, progressive adjustment of interests and planned interdependence is security metamorphosed from a metaphysical conception into a tangible and concrete reality. For an understanding of the problem it is requisite to bring into focus the various determinant forces which have conditioned the Baltic region historically, and to examine the efforts at adjustment which, during more than a decade of experience, have attested to its quest for security.

DETERMINANT FORCES

In the past, three historic forces have conditioned the political existence of the Baltic

area and determined its rôle in the life of Europe. The first of these was the *Drang nach Osten*—the apparently irrepressible urge of Teutonic Europe eastward through the centuries in quest of commerce, land or converts.³ The basic significance of the *Drang nach Osten* in the life of the Balticum has been at once its intermittency and its recurrence, and the fact that it has stamped upon the peoples of the area a tradition of connection with the West which no amount of Russification could efface. Originally the purveyor of religion, the *Drang nach Osten*,⁴ on the eve of the World War, was making conquest of these borderlands for the Industrial Revolution.

The second determinant in Baltic history has been the opposite of the first—the *Drang nach Westen*—the steady, relentless pressure of Muscovy, then of Imperial Russia, westward, seeking dynastic aggrandizement and outlets to the sea. The Romanovs made conquest of the Balticum not for the sake of the provinces themselves, which were wholly alien to their civilization, but because it meant gaining both ice-free harbors and positions of strategic importance for the

2. *Balticum* is used to refer to the eastern shorelands of the Baltic Sea.

3. Cf. Baron Michel de Taube, "Etudes sur le développement historique du droit international dans l'Europe orientale," Académie de Droit International, *Recueil des Cours*, Tome 11 (1926), p. 441-454.

4. The effect of the *Drang nach Osten* is historically traced in the *Memorandum on Latvia Addressed to the Peace Conference by the Lettish Delegation* (Paris, 1919), p. 12-17. Cf. also de Taube, "Etudes sur le développement historique du droit international dans l'Europe orientale," cited, and Emile Doumergue, *La Lettonie et la Baltique* (Paris, 1919).

1. M. W. Graham, "Stability in the Baltic States," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VII, No. 6, May 27, 1931.

security of commerce. With the advent of modern means of transportation, railway imperialism reinforced simple military conquest, and down to the end of the Empire both military and commercial policy held the Balticum in fief.

The third outstanding factor in the life of the Balticum has been sea power, a force operating inexorably in molding its political fortunes. The Baltic, once a Viking sea, later the seat of a Hanseatic confederacy, then a Swedish lake, became, with the decline of Sweden, an outpost of Russian imperial power. After the flag of the Romanovs was raised over the fortress of Aaland in 1809, no challenge to Russian possession of the eastern half of the Baltic Sea seemed possible for over a century. Yet the outbreak of the World War revealed almost immediately that the major relationships of sea power in the Baltic were swiftly changing. Owing to the use of mines in both belligerent and neutral waters and the rapid evolution of German sub-surface craft, Imperial Russia, without losing the vital strategic controls, was totally outdistanced in the Baltic. The collapse of Czardom and the concomitant disorganization of the fleet merely augmented German naval power. Thenceforth to the end of the war the Baltic became a German lake, and sea power, used in Russian hands merely for the passive maintenance of empire, was actively exploited by Germany for new conquest. It is in the light of this temporary German paramountcy in the Baltic that the evolution of the borderlands must be judged.⁵

THE BALTICUM AS A BARRIER

With these historic forces in mind as elements to be dealt with in any computation of security, it is necessary to turn to the record of the past fourteen years to discover the phases through which the problem has passed. From 1917 to 1921, due to the coincidence of war and revolution, the Balticum was in flux, without possibility of permanent orientation. The conflicting centrifugal and centripetal forces of nationality and imperialism came into violent collision along the borderlands of empire, and violent solu-

tions were attempted alike by Germany and Soviet Russia. Essentially a period of dissociation and upheaval, cadenced to the tramp of marching armies, it was dominated by the conception of utilizing the borderlands, from Finland to the Ukraine, as barriers, first (1918) against the eastward sweep of German influence, then (1919-1920) against the westward surge of social revolution. In the hour when their military fortunes were at the lowest ebb, the Allied powers re-invoked a historic policy of France—the ancient *barrière de l'est*⁶—as the fundamental pattern of behavior for the renascent Baltic borderlands. By extending to Finland and Estonia a type of provisional recognition before the signing of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Allies sought to withdraw from Germany legal title to territory conquered from Russia and to create out of the Baltic fringelands independent buffer states to limit Germany's eastward expansion. After the Armistice, when Germany's military power was broken, the emerging Baltic states were conceived of as forming a *cordon sanitaire* for the repression of militant communism. There was no change in the conception of barrier, only in the incidence of its function.

It is impossible to record here the vagaries of the barrier policy between 1918 and 1920. So long as militant communism, intent on spreading its propaganda by the sword, immediately menaced the Baltic peoples, they were adamant in the defense of their liberties and their territory; but when an attempt was made to utilize them to overthrow Soviet power and reinstate their old masters throughout the former imperial domain, the *cordon sanitaire* collapsed.

THE BALTIC PEACE: THE BASES OF SECURITY

With the peace negotiations in Tartu, Riga and Moscow in 1920, a new conception of relationships, based on the inexorable necessity of living together, came to dominate both the Bolsheviks and their immediate neighbors. Russia, in the treaties of peace,⁷

6. Cf. Ch. de Larivière, *L'Ukraine et la Petite Entente* (Paris, 1920).

7. These treaties embrace Russia's peace with Estonia (Treaty of Tartu, February 2, 1920, 11 *League of Nations Treaty Series* [hereinafter referred to as LNTS] 30); Lithuania (Treaty of Moscow, July 12, 1920, 3 LNTS 126); Latvia (Treaty of Riga, August 11, 1920, 2 LNTS 214); Poland (Preliminary

5. Cf. Arved Berg, *Latvia and Russia* (London, J. M. Dent & Sons, 1920), p. 86-87.

acknowledged unreservedly the independence of the Baltic states, renounced all claims to their territory, and gave bond to respect their sovereignty. The Baltic states pledged in kind, and both sides worked out the requisite guarantees against the renewal of war, intervention or counter-revolution.⁸

The Baltic peace was a real peace, laying the broad foundations for a system of non-aggression and based on the primary assumption that both sides were to be vouchsafed freedom from external attack upon their territory or furtive onslaughts on their social or governmental order. Save for the pledge of abstention from propaganda, which has proved almost impossible to enforce, the guarantees stipulated have, on the whole, been effective. The frontiers are reasonably respected and diplomatic relations, while not always cordial, are correct. There is security of status.

The Baltic peace was also significant because it reopened the avenues of commerce. Politically unimpeded transit commerce became the price of Baltic independence. Russia might renounce ownership of the "Windows on the West" for which Peter the Great paid his price, but the windows, in Baltic hands, must never be closed; if the Balticum was to cease to be a barrier, it must become a bridge between East and West.

The consequences of this change of policy led for the next decade to systematic negotiation to facilitate transit traffic, improve harbor and dockage facilities, and simplify formalities, dictating inter-Baltic cooperation on these matters, as well as settlements with Germany and Russia.⁹ Slowly, painfully, the reconstruction of the economic contacts of pre-war days has been accomplished by conferences of a technical and administrative character. Only the closure of the Polish-Lithuanian frontier, which runs athwart the principal arteries of commerce, bars the way to a complete understanding on

these topics. The Polish-Lithuanian *impasse*, however, has not been allowed to operate to Russia's detriment. Soviet shipments abound along the Baltic railways and up to the frontiers of Germany: from the standpoint of Moscow, the Windows on the West, though more distant, are a poignant reality.

THE QUEST FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Security of status and of commerce, while indispensable, have not sufficed in themselves to establish permanent peaceful relationships with powerful states to the east and west and to cement inter-Baltic understanding. The common objective of Baltic diplomacy has been that of enhancing political security on the basis of existing settlements. But while the Baltic peace treaties remain fundamental, it has taxed the political ingenuity of statesmen during the last decade to find appropriate formulae in terms of which an effective superstructure might be built. For an initial period (1921-1926), security was sought through multipartite action.

Through Alliance

The first conception of a common policy for the Balticum was that of alliance. To increase each other's security by a type of military guarantee was not an unnatural idea for states that had but recently been engaged in a common war for liberation from both German and Soviet rule. Finnish military cooperation had meant much to the Estonians in an hour of extremity; without joint military action, Latvia and Estonia could not have repulsed the armies of the Bolsheviks and of von der Goltz and Bermond; the clearing of eastern Latvia had been effected only by the cooperation of the Latvian and Polish armies against the Bolsheviks. With the approach of peace, common deliberations on military and diplomatic matters had taken place at Pskov, Tartu, Riga and Helsingfors. Peace between Latvia and Russia had been reached in the midst of the great Baltic Conference which had brought all the border states together at Bulduri, from August 6 to September 3, 1920. Following this conference the possibilities of security through the pool-

Peace of Riga, October 12, 1920, 4 LNTS 35, and the Final Peace of Riga, March 18, 1921, 6 LNTS 130; and Finland (Treaty of Tartu, October 14, 1920, 3 LNTS 69). To these should be added, for the sake of completeness, the separate treaties of peace signed by the Ukraine with Estonia (Treaty of Moscow, November 25, 1921, 11 LNTS 122); and with Latvia (Treaty of Moscow, August 3, 1921, 17 LNTS 346).

8. For a more detailed analysis of the stipulations of the peace treaties, cf. M. W. Graham, "The Soviet Security System," *International Conciliation*, No. 252, September 1929, p. 11-16.

9. Cf. M. W. Graham, *New Governments of Eastern Europe* (New York, Holt, 1927), p. 541-548.

ing of the diplomatic and military power of the five Baltic states seemed, for the moment, high. A policy of general alliance, however, involved far-reaching commitments and obvious difficulties; it could only have been defensive in character if it was not to violate the Covenant of the League of Nations into whose fold Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were then anxious to enter. In the last analysis a quintuple alliance of even a defensive character was made impossible by the psychological divergences between the outstanding states—Finland and Poland—which no document could efface, and by the persistence of the Polish-Lithuanian controversy.

The next step in concerted Baltic diplomacy was to endeavor to find the bases for a four-party agreement. Here Polish diplomacy, in concert with Estonia and Latvia, attempted through the Warsaw Agreement¹⁰ of March 17, 1922 to mollify Finnish opinion and attenuate the obligations of a four-power pact to the minimum limit compatible with concerted action. The bases of collaborative understanding laid down in the initial articles culminated in Article 7, which pledged the signatories to a benevolent attitude—i.e., one of indirect support—in the event of an aggression on one of them. Finland, however, failed to ratify the Agreement and the most concrete effort at a concerted alliance in the Baltic went into the discard. While the Agreement specified no state against which it was directed, Russia was in the mind of the negotiators, and Russia did not hesitate to make known its disapproval.

Through Disarmament

Thereafter, the initiative—morally and diplomatically—passed to Russia, and it was left to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs

to devise a new formula for Baltic-Soviet understanding.

That formula was disarmament. Convo-king at Moscow, in December 1922,¹¹ a conference of the Baltic states (Lithuania included), the Soviet government proposed a mutual limitation of armament, the "reciprocal neutralization of the limitrophe zones,"¹² and more rigorous measures for the final liquidation of armed bands in the vicinity of the frontiers.¹³ In the Soviet's announced program the political element—i.e., explicit pledges of arbitration and non-aggression—played no part. Finland, supported by Latvia and Lithuania, proposed the creation of comprehensive machinery for peaceful settlement;¹⁴ Poland, a pact of non-aggression.¹⁵ At first the Soviet delegation insisted on giving disarmament precedence over political guarantees; later it agreed to treat both questions simultaneously;¹⁶ finally it consented to discuss non-aggression and arbitration first, provided disarmament were also considered. The Estonian, Finnish, Latvian and Polish delegations took the position, however, that non-aggression and arbitration should take precedence, leaving disarmament and demilitarization to a subsequent conference.¹⁷ It was the refusal of Poland to arbitrate territorial questions, such as that regarding Vilna, and to denounce its alliances with Rumania and France as effective guarantees of its political sincerity that, in the words of Litvinov, "tended to sabotage the possibility of continuing the work."¹⁸ The Moscow Conference failed to bring about disarmament, but it revealed a much greater consensus than had previously been manifest in regard to the dual phases of any security agreement: (1) the renunciation of aggression and (2) the pacific settlement of all possible disputes. The objective of the Soviet government—to bring all the Baltic states and even Rumania

10. 11 LNTS 168. The agreement began by confirming reciprocal recognition of the peace treaties with Russia concluded by the contracting parties, pledged them not to enter into any agreement to the direct or indirect disadvantage of any one of them, laid down as obligatory the intercommunication of all treaties concluded with them, and outlined an extensive program of interstate cooperation along administrative and economic lines. Special provision was made for liberal treatment of minorities of one state constituting minorities in the territory of any other state signing the agreement. Article 6 pledged the signatories "to decide any controversy or dispute between their respective states solely by peaceful methods"—a phrase of subsequent importance at Moscow—and indicated arbitration and adjudication by the Permanent Court of International Justice as specific methods of solution. To Article 6 may be traced back the cardinal principles of the Helsinki Convention of January 17, 1925 (38 LNTS 358, q.v.).

11. Cf. *Conférence de Moscou pour la limitation des armements* (Moscow, 1923).

12. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 136, 218. This proposal was rejected, on the initiative of Latvia, on the ground that these matters were already provided for by the peace treaties.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 65, 66, 69.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 93-94.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 97, 101-103.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 219.

collectively to book on these principles—having failed,¹⁹ the Soviet Union resorted to other means to accomplish the desired result.

Through Neutrality

During 1923, when the political settlement made at Paris threatened to be overthrown by violence, Russia believed the time propitious for extending revolution to Germany by force of arms.²⁰ How to traverse the Balticum without endangering peace was a grave problem. Moscow took the initiative, proposing to each of the states separately that they individually sign treaties with Russia pledging (1) unconditional neutrality in the event of changes in the internal structure of third states, (2) uninterruptible transit to third countries, and (3) benevolent neutrality in the event of attack by third powers on the other contracting party. The rejection of these Soviet overtures closed the door to a guarantee of security solely in terms of pre-computed benevolent neutrality, but did not eradicate the idea; it merely deferred the application of the principle until 1926²¹ when a more comprehensive proposal was again broached by Moscow. Meanwhile the position of Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Poland was markedly clarified by the conclusion, at Helsingfors, on January 16, 1925, of a comprehensive quadripartite arbitration and conciliation convention establishing a machinery for settlement and appreciably minimizing potential inter-Baltic conflicts.²²

After Locarno—"the major stabilization of capitalism in the West"—it became for Russia a matter of both necessity and prestige once more to attempt a solution of the problem of its relations to its western neighbors, including Germany and the Balticum. On the foundation of German-Soviet relations established by the Rapallo Agreement of 1922, Moscow and Berlin reared an "anti-Locarno" superstructure by the Treaty of Berlin of April 24, 1926,²³ which integrated the principles of benevolent neutrality, non-participation in economic, military or political combinations, and the blanket pledge,

formulated at Warsaw and Moscow in 1922, to solve controversies solely by peaceful means. Almost simultaneously the Soviet government proposed to Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania a non-aggression pact²⁴ similar to that with Germany, without insisting, as it had done in 1922, on accompanying measures of disarmament. This move was intended to create an anti-Polish bloc through Lithuania's active intermediation. But because such a security pact, by guaranteeing existing territorial possessions, would have tended to raise doubts as to the legal validity of Lithuanian territory under the Treaty of Moscow, Lithuania refused to play the rôle intended for it. Once again a common bloc, even on this restricted basis, proved impossible of attainment. The Soviet government thereupon concluded with Lithuania a bilateral arrangement almost identic with the Treaty of Berlin²⁵ and continued its negotiations with the other three states.

Through Non-Aggression Pacts

In complicated diplomatic exchanges which continued through 1926, Estonia, Latvia and Finland made clear their fundamental viewpoints,²⁶ calling for the renunciation of specifically defined aggression, the commitment "equitably to regulate by peaceful means all differences which might arise," the safeguarding of rights flowing from League membership, the Åland Convention²⁷ and the Estonian-Latvian alliance,²⁸ a broadening of the non-intervention and anti-propaganda pledges in force and a broad right of adhesion by non-signatory states to the provisions of the conventions concluded. Russia replied by proposing bilateral pacts²⁹ covering merely the renunciation of aggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes, in lieu of a multilateral instrument. It also endeavored to define the obligations of League membership separately, and so as not to preclude "absolute neutrality in any possible international complications." Neutrality thus became the touchstone to the new conception

19. *Ibid.*, p. 233-235.

20. Cf. G. Bessedowsky, "Il Tentativo sovietico di una rivoluzione comunista in Germania," *Nuova Antologia*, Vol. 64, December 16, 1929, p. 454-463.

21. Cf. *European Economic and Political Survey*, Vol. I, No. 18, May 31, 1926, p. 13.

22. 38 LNTS, 358. Cf. p. 440, footnote 10.

23. 53 LNTS 392-396.

24. "We are proposing," declared Litvinov, "a treaty of guaranty to the Baltic States, whether separately, collectively, or with a group of them. . . ." (*Izvestia*, April 27, 1926.)

25. 60 LNTS 145. Cf. Graham, "The Soviet Security System," cited, p. 30-31, and *Izvestia*, April 25, 1926.

26. Riga, *Segodnia*, May 8, 1926.

27. 9 LNTS 212.

28. 23 LNTS 82.

29. *Izvestia*, August 3, 1926.

of security, and the formulae of 1923 were combined with the principles set forth at Moscow in 1922. When, however, Finland, Estonia and Latvia proposed a preparatory commission composed of representatives of all states with which Russia was negotiating,³⁰ the Soviet government categorically rejected the suggestion and the period of concerted negotiation ended.³¹

When viewed in retrospect, the negotiations reveal that the desire of the Soviet government, as indicated by Litvinov, to conclude a multilateral pact was lukewarm from the outset, and the attempt at negotiations with a restricted group no more substantial. In the long run the Soviet Union reverted to the policy, already inaugurated in the Levant, of negotiating separate bilateral agreements with each of its contiguous neighbors, and sought to apply this policy in the West. The negotiations with Lithuania, as already noted, bore fruit,³² those with Latvia came virtually to maturity,³³ but those with Estonia, Finland³⁴ and Poland³⁵ were destined to fall short of completion. The policy adopted at the end of the period of vacillation closing in 1926 has, in the course of the last five years, become rigid, and today the Soviet government stands definitely opposed to a collective security agreement.³⁶ *La politique d'éventail*—a system of independent bilateral non-

aggression pacts in which the idea of neutrality finds applicability—is and remains the chief cornerstone of Soviet security policy. Progress within its limits has, since 1926, confined itself to (1) the widening of the scope of “non-aggression,”³⁷ and (2) the creation in the case of Germany, of an archetypal conciliation convention for the liquidation of disputes. This has now been integrated with the Treaty of Berlin.³⁸

ROLE OF THE LITVINOV PROTOCOL

Despite the absence of a collective non-aggression pact, there are three multilateral conventions of importance in computing Baltic security—the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact³⁹ and the Litvinov Protocol.⁴⁰ Russia, not being bound by the Covenant, has endeavored mainly to prevent that instrument from being used against it—hence the neutrality clauses and the pledges to non-participation in military, political or economic coalitions contained in its accomplished treaties and unconsummated bilateral proposals. For the other states the Covenant possesses both juridical validity and political and diplomatic significance. All the states concerned are bound by the Kellogg Pact, but the deficiencies of existing procedure for putting it into operation make it of secondary significance. For the Baltic states it is the Litvinov Protocol, signed at Moscow February 9, 1929, applying the Kellogg Pact directly in the relations of the Baltic states and Russia, which assumes primary importance in reinforcing the obligations to peaceful settlement and renunciation of war. Because its commitments renounce merely some forms of aggression, its scope is narrower than that of the various security proposals hitherto made; because it pledges pacific settlement, it integrates as between signatories and adherents the existing machinery of peace

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*, August 27, 1926.

32. These culminated in the Second Treaty of Moscow, September 27, 1926, and notes exchanged reaffirming the territorial settlement of 1920. (Cf. *Izvestia*, September 30, 1926 and Gregor Rutenberg, “Der litauisch-russische Freundschafts- und Neutralitätsvertrag und die Wilnafrage im Lichte des Völkerrechts,” 14 *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht*, 1927-1928, p. 370-385.) The treaty and annexed notes were renewed by a special protocol at Moscow May 6, 1931. (Cf. *Izvestia*, May 7, 1931.)

33. Estonia and Latvia moved in parallel on matters of security policy until the beginning of 1927 when Felix Cielsens, an outstanding Social Democrat, became Latvian Foreign Minister. By dint of rapid negotiation with Aralov, the Soviet Minister to Latvia, the two were able to initial, on March 9, 1927 at Riga, a provisional agreement on the major items of a security arrangement. This ended the formal negotiations, as Latvia proceeded no further with the treaty discussions. (Cf. *Izvestia*, March 15, 16, 1927, *Pravda*, March 18, 1927, and Graham, “The Soviet Security System,” cited, p. 31-32, 79-80.)

34. Finland encountered an intransigent attitude on the part of the U.S.S.R. in regard to arbitration; Russia was willing to agree to a commission *compromissaire* only, not to an arbitral tribunal. This led to the indefinite suspension of the negotiations. (Cf. Riga, *Sogodnia*, January 5, 1927.)

35. On August 23, 1931 the Polish Minister at Moscow submitted to the Soviet government a revised project which reiterated the positions taken by Poland in 1926. This was immediately rejected by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Cf. *Le Temps*, August 28, 1931.

36. It appears that Poland sought, in August 1931, to turn the non-aggression proposals of Russia into a multipartite pact, by proposing a right of adhesion of the Baltic states and Rumania to the bilateral treaty suggested by Moscow. The Soviet government indicated that it preferred to deal “with each country separately and not with a Round Table.” (*Ibid.*) In Litvinov's absence from Moscow, the Soviet of People's Commissars, on August 30, 1931, decided formally that “in

its negotiations with Poland . . . the Soviet Government excludes the possibility of simultaneous negotiations with the Baltic States and Rumania.” (*Ibid.*, August 31, 1931.)

37. Cf. M. W. Graham, “The Soviet Security Treaties,” *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 23 (April 1929), p. 338-350.

38. The Conciliation Convention was signed at Moscow on January 25, 1929 for a term of three years. It was renewed by the Protocol of Moscow of June 24, 1931 (*Izvestia*, June 30, 1931) which made impossible denunciation separately from the Treaty of Berlin of April 24, 1926.

39. 94 LNTS 57.

40. 89 LNTS 369.

elaborated by the national diplomacy of each of the countries concerned. But that is all. In itself it pledges no territorial guarantees, gives no positive commitments, establishes no machinery of settlement and stipulates no pre-computed course of conduct in specific contingencies. The Litvinov Protocol is only a norm for the collective behavior of the border states and Russia, to be blocked out by future negotiations and adapted to par-

ticular situations by subsidiary treaties. That is why security in the Baltic area emerges as a synthesis of measures taken by the national diplomacy of the component states to adjust their differences and stabilize their relations. To these creative efforts of diplomacy, deep grounded in the policies of the individual states, one must turn for the completing factors in the evaluation of Baltic security policy.

FINLAND

MARITIME SECURITY

Of all the Baltic states Finland occupies the most exposed geographical position. It has longer frontiers than any other state save Poland, and boundaries which are at many points militarily indefensible. From Norway and Sweden, however, Finland faces no danger, and possession of the Aaland Islands gives it the keys to the Gulf of Bothnia and the Eastern Baltic. The security of its commerce, however, is primarily conditioned upon the control of the outlets to the Baltic, hence Finland is aware that it must remain on terms of friendly understanding with those countries possessing appreciable naval strength. This consideration prompted its entente with Germany in 1918;⁴¹ and led to a strongly Anglophil foreign policy in the years immediately following the Armistice. At the present time Finland can rely upon the Aaland Convention⁴² for defense of its maritime frontiers, and upon the naval clauses of the Treaty of Versailles⁴³ to protect it from a possible resurgence of German naval power. In view of the reductions in the British fleet effected by the Washington and London conferences, it may well be questioned whether the dominion of the Baltic lies, even potentially, in British hands. Rather may it be said that in the Baltic sea power is in commission, with no one power exercising either domin-

ion or control. On the Gulf of Finland, likewise, a situation of naval equilibrium exists, Finnish forces being inconsiderable, while Soviet naval craft are restricted to a very small sector. The principal fortresses have been demilitarized under the provisions of the treaty of peace with Russia.⁴⁴ The basic factor in maritime security in the Baltic has been the disappearance of the great German and Russian fleets. So long as that condition continues, the maritime security of all the Baltic states is reasonably assured, as is also the continuity of food supply—a consideration of special significance to Finland after the famine of 1918 produced by the Allied blockade.

THE PROBLEM OF EASTERN KARELIA

Finland's major problem is bound up with its long land frontier with the Soviet Union,⁴⁵ a boundary complicated by considerations of strategy on the one hand and political irreverentism on the other. The Petrograd-Murmansk railway, which afforded direct access to ice-free ports on the Arctic Ocean was considered, after the experiences of the Civil War, so vital to the security of the Soviet state that in the making of peace no compromise in regard to it would be entertained by the Soviet authorities, and Finland had to acquiesce in the loss of Eastern Karelia, the area through which the railway runs.

41. By an exchange of notes of March 7, 1918, a secret agreement was entered into between Finland and Germany in regard to commerce, navigation, and the utilization of Finnish waters as German naval bases. (Von Stumm, Undersecretary of State, to Hjelt and Erich, Auswärtiges Amt, Fr. II, 677, and acknowledgement. State Department files.)

42. The Aaland Convention (9 LNTS 212), demilitarizing and "neutralizing" the Aaland Islands, was negotiated and signed in Geneva, October 20, 1921, between Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland. It is noteworthy that neither Russia nor Lithuania are signatories, nor have they been invited to accede thereto.

43. Articles 181-197.

44. Articles 13 and 14, Treaty of Tartu, 3 LNTS 69.

45. The Treaty of Tartu left to future elaboration in the form of conventions the detailed stipulations of its own provisions. In pursuance of this policy a number of treaties have been concluded dealing with frontier questions (16 LNTS 318), determination of water boundaries (19 LNTS 184), frontier fisheries and police (19 LNTS 154, 29 LNTS 212, and 70 LNTS 201). Agreements to assure free transit across the Petsamo region, where Finland touches the Arctic Ocean, were also entered into (19 LNTS 200, 30 LNTS 50).

Such renunciation was painful to Finland, which claimed the area on grounds of ethnographic affiliation. Twice in the period since Finland's declaration of independence a major uprising of the populace in Eastern Karelia has occurred with a view to effecting either an organic union with the Finnish Republic or the establishment of an independent neutralized state: first in the spring of 1919,⁴⁶ after the partial withdrawal of the Allied forces, who had not hesitated to sow the seeds of separatism among the native populace, and again in 1921-1922⁴⁷ when the authority of the Karelian Labor Commune, organized in 1920 by Bolshevik partisans, was temporarily overthrown by a group claiming to represent democratic elements. In the first instance the Soviet authorities suppressed the uprising before peace was made with Finland and the historic moment for acquiring Karelia passed; in the world setting of 1921 the second Karelian revolt was bound to be abortive, and the effort of the Finnish government to bring the Karelian question before the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice was unsuccessful.⁴⁸ Until very re-

cently the Finnish government and people have been reluctant to accept the existing Finnish frontier as final: there is no disposition to force the issue, but the sense of cultural mission embodied in the Lapua movement⁴⁹ seems to be the vehicle through which irredentist opinion functions.⁵⁰ Widespread dissatisfaction at the territorial arrangement⁵¹ has inevitably influenced the general attitude of the Finnish government in its security negotiations with Russia.

SECURITY POLICY

Finland was a partner, it will be recalled, in the ill-starred Warsaw Agreement of 1922; it participated at Moscow in December 1922 when reduction of armaments was in prospect; but it was not involved, so far as is known, in the so-called neutrality negotiations of 1923, and, as has already been noted, failed to reach an agreement on a separate security pact with Russia in 1927. Although adhering to the Kellogg Pact in 1928, Finland refrained from participation in the Litvinov Protocol of 1929 or from subsequent adhesion thereto. It has placed its faith in the machinery of Geneva rather than that of Moscow, and particularly in the Convention for Financial Assistance, which had Finland's sponsorship from its inception. While Finland's relations to its Western and Baltic neighbors are governed by comprehensive arbitration and conciliation agreements,⁵² and

46. As early as July 1918, on the eve of the attempt of Germany to bring about a settlement of Russo-Finnish relations under its auspices in Berlin, claims were put forward by Finnish journals to Karelia and the Murman Railway. (Consul Haynes, from Helsingfors, to the Department of State, July 13, 1918, No. 23, State Department files.) During the late summer of 1919 Karelian forces, under English auspices, inaugurated a separatist movement to establish an independent Karelia. (Sheldon Whitehouse, from Stockholm, to the Secretary of State, October 18, 1918, No. 3016, citing the *Tammerfors Aamulehti* of October 12, 1918.) Shortly after the Armistice the *Helsingin Sanomat* (November 21, 1918) took it for granted that "the union with us of Far Karelia should meet no hindrance at the Peace Conference." (Morris to Lansing from Stockholm, November 26, 1918, No. 3224.) The first actual rising, with Finnish assistance, took place at the beginning of May 1919. The lifting of the food blockade on Finland and the sending of American food supplies were construed by the Finnish press into support by Mr. Hoover of the Karelian independence movement. (Haynes to Polk from Helsingfors, May 3, 1919, No. 262, and accompanying memoranda on "The Rising in Karelia, April 29, 1919," and "The Karelian Question," May 5, 1919.)

47. Documentary material on the Eastern Karelia question emanates from three sources: (1) the Karelians themselves, who published in December 1921 a compilation descriptive of their claims (*Gouvernement Central de la Carelie, Le Droit de la Carelie*, Helsingfors, 1922, p. 110) and later embellished their case with excerpts from Finno-Russian correspondence and deliberations of the League of Nations (Delegation Carelienne, *Livre Vert: Actes et Documents concernant la Question Carelienne*, Helsingfors, 1922, p. 230); (2) the Finnish government, which, before taking the matter to the League of Nations, published through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs *La Question de la Carelie Orientale*, Helsingfors, February 1922, p. 105, and followed it by second and third instalments published in September 1923 (p. 102) and September 1924 (p. 88) recounting the actions of the League of Nations Council and the Permanent Court of International Justice; (3) the Soviet government, which issued through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a *Livre Rouge: Documents et Correspondance diplomatique russo-finlandaise concernant la Carelie Orientale*, Moscow, April 1922, p. viii, 131.

48. On July 23, 1923 the Permanent Court of International Justice, by a vote of 7 to 4, declined to give to the Council of the League of Nations the Advisory Opinion requested in the matter. (Cf. Permanent Court of International Justice, *Collection of Advisory Opinions*, No. 5.)

49. Cf. Graham, "Stability in the Baltic States," cited, p. 124.

50. The activity of the so-called Ingrian Committee during the spring of 1931 in organizing demonstrations protesting against the Soviet policy of mass deportations from the regions between Leningrad and the Finnish frontier is also significant. The Finnish government, invoking the guarantees given at Tartu in 1920, finally protested on May 18, 1931 against the deportations, only to be met with a sharp rebuff. In a note of May 24, Acting Commissar Krestinski sharply reminded the Finnish government that Moscow "cannot tolerate such an intervention into the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R." (*Pravda*, May 26, 1931.) It was openly charged (*Pravda*, April 24, 1931, and *Izvestia*, May 10, 1931) that the Finnish Foreign Office was publicly abetting the Ingrian "counter-revolutionary movement" and privately subsidizing the Ingrian Committee. Cf. also the *Opinion* of Professor S. R. Björkstén, of the University of Helsingfors, on the applicability of the treaty guarantees to the Ingrian population (Helsingfors, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1931, p. 8) and the *Report of the Ingrian Committee* "On the Persecutions of the Ingrian Finns in the R.S.F.S.R.," published in Helsingfors, April 1931, p. 8.

51. Articles 10 and 11 of the Treaty of Tartu forced the Finnish government to withdraw its troops from the communes of Repola and Porajärvi. These were to be added to the autonomous territory of Eastern Karelia which was to include the Karelian population of the provinces of Archangel and Olonez. The whole, as organized into the Karelian Labor Commune on June 7, 1920, was to "enjoy the national right of self-determination." It is significant that on July 25, 1923, two days after the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague not to review the treaty stipulations in question, the R.S.F.S.R. raised Eastern Karelia to the status of an Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic with the R.S.F.S.R.

52. In dealing with the Scandinavian countries Finland first concluded, on June 27, 1924, separate conciliation treaties with each (Sweden, 29 LNTS 20, Norway, 29 LNTS 404, and Den-

while it has strenuously sponsored the general cause of arbitration, the machinery for peaceful liquidation of all disputes—the

touchstone to non-aggression agreements—has been conspicuously lacking in its relations with Russia.^{52a}

ESTONIA

DEPENDENCE ON SEA POWER

Due to an extensive coast line, Estonia has felt as keenly as any of the Baltic countries the significance of sea power. It was largely the timely arrival of British naval forces after the German evacuation of Tallinn in 1918 that prevented the subjugation of Estonia by Soviet naval forces. In return, Estonia at one time⁵³ thought seriously of an alliance with Britain, comparable in its potential utility to Britain's ancient alliance with Portugal. Deconcentration of naval power in the Baltic made this unnecessary, even had it been desirable from England's standpoint, and the awarding of the Åland Islands to Finland removed certain potential dangers. From 1919 to 1930 Estonia relied implicitly upon British assistance in the event of an attack upon its territory by land or sea. With the reductions in auxiliary craft effected by the London Conference, however, it was apparent that effective British forces could not be easily deployed in the Baltic in future, and that Estonia might have to count upon a contingency in which British support would not be forthcoming. Estonia thereupon turned, politically and navally, toward Poland, which, without officially committing itself, *ipsissimis verbis*, sent its destroyer force to accompany the Polish President on an official visit to Estonia in August 1930.⁵⁴ Gdynia is, after all,

appreciably nearer than London. While it cannot be said that a Polish-Estonian naval understanding exists officially, it is unlikely that an imminent menace to Estonia would be regarded by Poland with complacency.

TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

At the time of the Peace Conference in 1919 Estonia laid claim to more territory than it eventually acquired. The claim to Ingermanland, embracing the area between Lakes Peipus and Pskov and the outskirts of Petrograd, was advanced on ethnographic grounds, as there had been from prehistoric times a zone of continuous Estonian colonization in this area.⁵⁵ After the defeat of Judenitch by the Red Army (1919), Estonia abandoned these territorial claims and accepted as its frontier with Russia a line providing the shortest possible land and the maximum water boundary through Lakes Peipus and Pskov. In the light of the guarantees given in the treaty of Tartu,⁵⁶ the security of this border from land attack seems relatively high, although possibilities of aerial attack are not excluded.

Estonia's sole remaining frontier is that with Latvia. Shortly after the proclamation of Latvian independence and the expulsion, by joint Estonian and Latvian forces, of the Soviet troops which had invaded the region, a demarcation line was laid down by joint agreement.⁵⁷ Disputes having arisen over portions of it, they were submitted, in virtue of an arbitration agreement of March 23, 1920,⁵⁸ to the decision of a British army offi-

mark, 33 LNTS 132), and later, in 1926, followed them with more comprehensive conventions on arbitration (Sweden, 49 LNTS 367, Denmark, 51 LNTS 367, and Norway, 60 LNTS 353). Similar conciliation and arbitration conventions exist with Germany (43 LNTS 347), Hungary (96 LNTS 67), Belgium (69 LNTS 361), and France (24 *American Journal of International Law* 601). There is a separate arbitration convention with the United States (87 LNTS 15). Separate conciliation conventions exist with the United States (87 LNTS 9) and the Netherlands (87 LNTS 321), while conventions on conciliation and judicial settlement exist with Switzerland (77 LNTS 93), Spain (82 LNTS 229), and Italy (89 LNTS 25). Finland early signed the Protocol of the Permanent Court of International Justice and subsequently adhered to the Optional Clause.

52a. While this report was in press, the Finnish and Soviet governments, after a fortnight of renewed negotiations, initialled at Helsingfors on January 21, 1932 a non-aggression treaty defining aggression, pledging neutrality in the event of conflict of either signatory with a third party, and guaranteeing the existing frontiers on the basis of the Treaty of Tartu. While the pact was signed without consultation of the other countries, ratification was made conditional upon the conclusion of similar treaties between the Soviet Union and its other Western neighbors. (*New York Times*, January 22, 24, 1932.)

53. For a discussion of Estonia's extreme Anglophil orientation, cf. *Izvestia*, March 9, 1926.

54. For a detailed analysis of Estono-Polish relations, cf. the account by Professor Antonius Piip in the Tallinn *Vaba*

Maa, August 10, 1930. Charges that Estonia is bound by special agreements with Poland abounded in the Soviet press in 1931. (Cf. *Izvestia*, January 2, 1931, and *Pravda*, May 6, 1931, the latter emphasizing the openly pro-Polish utterances of the Estonian generalissimo, J. Laidoner.)

55. Cf. the *Mémoire sur l'indépendance de l'Esthonie présenté à la Conférence de la Paix par la Délégation esthonienne* (Paris, 1919), p. 31-32. The Pskov-Gatchina-Petrograd railroad, just embraced within the territory claimed, would have furnished an excellent means for the defence of the additional area. The validity of the Estonian claim to Ingermanland is to some extent verified by the decision of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. in October 1926 to create an "autonomous Estonian Soviet Republic" in this area, with its administrative center at Kingissep. (Cf. the Helsingfors *Hu/vudsbladet*, October 9, 1926.)

56. According to Article 3 of the treaty, certain frontier zones were carefully demilitarized and Lake Pskov was not to have any armament. The craft authorized on Lake Peipus were also carefully restricted.

57. *Mémoire*, cited, p. 32.

58. 2 LNTS 188.

cer, Colonel Tallents, whose award⁵⁹ was accepted integrally by both parties.

SECURITY AGREEMENTS

A logical corollary of Estonian-Latvian cooperation in the war of liberation was a political understanding and mutual guarantee of assistance in case of danger. Following the rejection of the Warsaw Agreement, a defensive alliance between Latvia and Estonia was negotiated on November 1, 1923.⁶⁰ This reproduces, with minor changes of phraseology, the principal features of the Warsaw Agreement. The belated effort of Russia in 1923 to utilize the camouflage of unconditional neutrality and unrestricted transit as a vehicle for transporting revolution to Germany was probably instrumental in hastening the conclusion of the alliance; it certainly furnished the occasion for cementing the informally established *entente*

cordiale between the two states. The simultaneous conclusion of a treaty for customs union⁶¹ marked the extension of the entente into the economic field, despite the delays and practical difficulties encountered in its application.

Estonia, as already noted, proceeded much further along the path of a separate non-aggression and security pact with Russia in 1926 than did Finland, but found various technical difficulties in the way of concluding such an agreement.⁶² Estonia adhered to the Kellogg Pact immediately before joining with her neighbors in the Litvinov Protocol. Estonia's commitments are therefore wider than those of Finland but narrower than those binding Latvia and Lithuania. Like Finland, it has shown steadfast support of conciliation and arbitration agreements, and concluded a number of such treaties.⁶³

LATVIA

TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENTS

Of all the Baltic states, Latvia has had the fewest difficulties in determining its territorial limits. Those with Estonia and Lithuania⁶⁴ were settled by an arbitral award closely following the ethnographic boundary between the countries. Due to the fact, however, of a territorial claim reaching somewhat farther east than the eastern boundaries of Lithuania, as defined by the Treaty of Moscow of July 12, 1920, Latvia deferred the formal definition of this portion of its boundary until the conclusion of peace with Russia;⁶⁵ following the occupation of the Dvinsk corridor by Polish forces,⁶⁶ it was necessary to come to a territorial understanding with Poland. Latvia today is obliged to recognize as Polish parts of the Dvinsk corridor assigned to Lithuania by the Soviet-Lithuanian Peace Treaty, at least on the common boundary south of the city of

Dvinsk. The regions claimed by Latvia in its negotiations with Soviet Russia were only those predominantly Lettish, with small Polish minorities.⁶⁷ Viewed from the standpoints of both stability and security, this abstention from ethnographically unjustifiable claims did much to strengthen the internal position of Latvia and enhance the security of its frontiers.

ATTITUDE TOWARD SEA POWER

Latvia's concern in Baltic sea power is based upon substantially the same grounds

59. For the frontier agreement, cf. 17 LNTS 190. For various other agreements relating to demarcation, delimitation and police of the frontiers, cf. 25 LNTS 346; 38 LNTS 104, 114; 45 LNTS 178, 179; and a final liquidation agreement of 1927, 61 LNTS 315, 322.

60. 23 LNTS 81. The alliance has been characterized as an application *à deux* of the principles of the Warsaw Agreement, with the additional explicit promise of mutual assistance, and not merely of benevolent neutrality.

61. 25 LNTS 360. Implementing of the customs union awaited the conclusion of a treaty of execution of February 5, 1927 (62 LNTS 310), which encountered additional obstacles. Further consideration of the customs union was undertaken by the two governments in a conference at Riga on May 6-8, 1931. (Cf. *Izvestia*, May 6, 1931.)

62. Cf. *Pravda*, January 26, 1927.

63. These involve the quadripartite Helsingfors Convention on compulsory arbitration (38 LNTS 358); conciliation conventions with Sweden (46 LNTS 289), Denmark (63 LNTS 363) and the United States (102 LNTS 239); a conciliation and arbitration convention with Germany (63 LNTS 111); a convention on judicial settlement, arbitration and conciliation with Czechoslovakia (101 LNTS 423); a separate arbitration treaty with the United States (102 LNTS 233); and an interesting convention with the U.S.S.R. on settlement of frontier disputes (70 LNTS 401). Estonia early signed the Protocol of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and accepted the Optional Clause on May 2, 1923.

64. 2 LNTS 234; 3 LNTS 266; and 17 LNTS 212.

65. Cf. Article 3 of the Treaty of Riga (2 LNTS 196), and Article 2 of the Treaty of Moscow (3 LNTS 125). It may legitimately be inferred from the remark following the latter article, declaring that "the frontier line between Lithuania and Poland, and between Lithuania and Latvia will be fixed by agreement with these States," that it was not the intention of the Soviet government at that time (July 12, 1920) that there should be a common frontier between Poland and Latvia. It should be remembered that Latgale, the easternmost part of Latvia, historically formed part of Polish Livonia before the First Partition. However, after joint Polish and Latvian forces had cleared the Dvinsk Corridor, Poland renounced this region and it remained in Latvian possession. (Cf. Leon Wasilewsky, *Les frontières orientales de la Pologne*, p. 29.)

66. Cf. p. 449, footnote 77 with reference to the statements of Przybylski.

67. Latvia did not lay claim to territories farther east, although there are numerous enclaved Lettish settlements east

as that of Estonia: both learned the significance of naval dominion in the Baltic from bitter experiences in the World War. After the withdrawal of German military and naval forces from the major part of Livonia and Courland late in 1918, British craft arrived too late to prevent the Bolshevik occupation of Riga,⁶⁸ and although the evicted government found British support at Liepaja (Libau), the assistance by British naval forces was not nearly so significant as in the case of Estonia. Hence it may be said that Latvia, while profiting from the collapse of German and Russian naval power, has only a secondary interest in seeing it replaced by British control, and prefers instead to develop a naval establishment sufficient to defend its own coasts and protect Riga. This circumstance, born of the first hours in the history of the new republic, has differentiated the general outlook of Latvia from that of Estonia and made it less openly Anglophil in its orientation. Latvia alone has developed a genuinely "Baltic" viewpoint on the problems of sea power.

RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

Latvian relations with Germany have been largely conditioned by the behavior of the occupying authorities in the months immediately after the Armistice and by experiences with the rump counter-revolutionary armies of von der Goltz and Bermond. The persistence of German annexationist plans and conspiracies poisoned the political atmosphere in 1919, and it was not until the middle of 1920 that formal diplomatic relations were assumed and provisional *de jure* recognition given. Under the circumstances, Latvia, unlike any other of the Baltic states, was compelled to demand of the Reich guarantees⁶⁹ against the recrudescence of the type of subversive activities practiced by the Iron Division and the notorious Baltic Army. While the form they assume is reciprocal in

the incidence of its obligations, it is at once obvious that Berlin would have little to fear from the potential machinations of the Letts. Essentially Latvia and Germany remain politically at the point of equilibrium reached in 1920.

RELATIONS WITH BALTIC STATES

The pacific character of Latvia's foreign policy in relation to its Baltic neighbors hardly demands elaboration. Grounded in the conception of Baltic solidarity and the necessity of cooperative action of all the neighboring states, Latvia's policy has elicited the maximum results in cooperation, and progressed cautiously but systematically in the direction of general collaborative understanding and settlement. Allied only to Estonia, but maintaining an *entente cordiale* with Poland, Latvia has refrained from attempting to form powerful political connections with any of the major powers of Europe. Following the defeat of the Warsaw Agreement, Latvia reverted to a series of bilateral, tripartite and quadripartite agreements for the purpose of consolidating its own and its neighbors' positions, and of providing the machinery for peaceful liquidation of disputes. This was a cardinal point with Latvia in the negotiations at Moscow in 1922; it has remained a cornerstone of Latvian policy. In dealing with more remote powers, Latvia has apparently preferred multilateral arbitral agreements; and has entered into only a small number of bilateral conciliation and arbitration treaties,⁷⁰ depending primarily on the machinery of Geneva and The Hague to adjust possible conflicts with non-adjacent states.

GENERAL VIEW OF SECURITY

Latvia was in the vortex of the Soviet government's neutrality and free transit negotiations in 1923, but sensed an ulterior motive and refused to accede to the Soviet proposals. In 1926, when the Soviet government renewed its advances on the matter of

of Indria whose inhabitants, particularly in the neighborhood of Drissa, solicited the annexation of these regions. (Cf. *Bulletin of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, No. 30, September 5, 1920, p. 4, c. 3.)

68. Cf. August Winnig, *Am Ausgang der deutschen Ostpolitik* (Berlin 1921), p. 68-87.

69. Thus Article 3 of the Treaty of Berlin of July 18, 1920 (2 LNTS 97) pledges the signatories "not to support or permit any agitation directed against the established government of the other party" and not to permit "passage or organization of hostile military forces." This pledge was not given until all hope of Germanizing the Balticum had been abandoned and appears, precisely in view of that hopelessness, to have been strictly respected.

70. Treaty of Kaunas, November 25, 1930 (25 *American Journal of International Law* 351). The existing arrangements of a bilateral character are conciliation conventions with Sweden (37 LNTS 132) and the United States (USTS 819), and an arbitration treaty with the United States (USTS 818). Of unusual interest, is an agreement with the U.S.S.R. to apply arbitration in civil and commercial matters (84 LNTS 47).

security and seemed willing to consider a multilateral pact, Latvia accepted in principle and negotiated in parallel with Estonia and Finland.⁷¹ Early in 1927, as already noted, Latvia went a step further and initialled a draft non-aggression pact.⁷² Considerations of internal politics prevented the maturing of this agreement, but it laid down the bold outlines of general policy between the two countries sufficiently clearly to indicate the line of conduct which both would

probably follow in given contingencies. Having thus renounced aggression in principle, the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy was an inevitable step, and Latvia adhered to the Kellogg Pact without delay, thereby paving the way for participation in the Litvinov Protocol. Certainly Latvia has proceeded in the direction of giving and accepting security guarantees as far as the geographical position of the country and the political climate of Riga will permit.

LITHUANIA

In marked contrast to Latvia, Lithuania has experienced inordinate hardships in consolidating its territorial position and obtaining guarantees against aggression. The difficulties have not come from the Latvian side; Lithuania has ample assurances as to its security along that sector. Nor does a limited coastal strip on the Baltic afford cause for apprehension. Owing to its adjacency to Germany and the short length of its coast line, Lithuania is far less dependent on maritime connections with the outside world than any of the other Baltic states. Since British sea power was not required for its liberation, Lithuania, while valuing Britain's friendship, has not in any sense followed an Anglophil policy.

THE KLAIPEDA (MEMEL) TERRITORY

The situation on the west is not so simple. Lithuania suffered less than either Estonia or Latvia from the post-Armistice activity of the German occupying authorities, who posed as Lithuania's benefactors in the hour of its national resurgence; the Baltic Army played practically no part in its post-war history. The severance of the Memel territory from East Prussia by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles was, however, accepted by the Reich with the greatest reluctance, and Allied delays in effecting a final disposition of the Memel area were destined to increase the tension between Lithuania and the Reich. The final allocation of Memel to Lithuania by the Convention of May 8, 1924,"

in frustration of both German and Polish designs on the region, operated to clarify the situation, and to define with precision a part of Lithuania's western boundary, but in no wise indicated an abandonment of German claims to the region.

RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

Lithuania's relations with Germany have been complicated to an extent by two factors: (1) the German drive for treaty revision, which envisages a restoration of the Memel territory to the Reich at Lithuania's expense, and (2) the unsatisfactory condition of German-Polish relations, which can only be remedied, in German opinion, by some territorial juggling.⁷⁴ The relations between Germany and Lithuania have several times been embittered by the events in the Memel territory where German nationalist activity has embarrassed the action of the Lithuanian authorities. On the other hand, it has been suggested in Polish circles on more than one occasion that, if Germany desires a retrocession of Danzig, Poland would consider favorably the annexation of Memel as a substitute. The latter suggestion, which gained most support in the period before the *de jure* recognition of Lithuania and the awarding of the area to Lithuania, has become largely unfeasible with the lapse of time, although it is occasionally reiterated. To accede to it, particularly since the creation of a powerful port and naval base for

71. Cf. p. 441.

72. Cf. Graham, "The Soviet Security System," cited, p. 31-32 and 79-80; cf. also *Izvestia*, March 15 and 16, 1927, and *Pravda*, March 17, 1927.

73. 29 LNTS 86. Cf. the Lithuanian Yellowbook, *Documents Diplomatiques: Question de Memel. Première Volume:*

Depuis la Conférence de la Paix (1919) jusqu'au renvoi de la Question par la Conférence des Ambassadeurs devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, 29 Septembre, 1923 (Kaunas, 1923). *Deuxième Volume: Règlement de la Question de Memel par le Conseil de la Société des Nations* (Kaunas, 1924).

74. Cf. in this relation, Freiherr von Rheinbaben, "Zwölf Thesen zur Revisionspolitik," *Europäische Gespräche*, Jahrg. IX, No. 2, February 1931, p. 82-99.

Poland at Gdynia, would leave East Prussia, even with Danzig retroceded, pinioned between Polish bases at Gdynia and Memel, and would be too great a territorial menace for a strongly nationalist Germany to consider, even if it should receive the assent of the great powers. It is, furthermore, unlikely that Lithuania would surrender Memel without coercion.

Definite progress toward the clarification of German-Lithuanian relations was made in 1928 when Stresemann and Voldemaras arrived at a comprehensive settlement.⁷⁵ The conventions accepted the existing frontiers, which are almost consistently ethnographic, and provided a comprehensive machinery for peaceful liquidation of potential controversies. The factor still lacking in the relations of Germany and Lithuania has been a definite security and non-aggression agreement, which would give evidence of a genuine abandonment of the political *Drang nach Osten* which dominated Germany's early plans for Lithuania. The negotiation of such an agreement would go far toward simplifying the problem of Baltic security.

RELATIONS WITH WHITE RUSSIA

On the east, Lithuania's frontiers were complicated by the emergence, in 1919, of a White Russian nationalist movement, democratic in character and basically anti-Bolshevik and anti-Polish. Too weak to maintain its momentum in the face of both Polish and Soviet opposition, the White Russian movement made terms with the much older, stronger and deeply rooted Lithuanian national movement, and in February 1919 the sprawling and amorphous White Russian Democratic Republic attempted to join forces with Lithuania.⁷⁶ The White Russian independence movement was exceedingly short-lived and was actively supported by only a fringe of race-conscious intellectuals

who finally found a haven in Kaunas. It did, however, have an important reflex bearing on the question of Lithuania's eastern frontiers as acceptance of the principle of federation would have brought Lithuania's borders east of Minsk. In the end, by the terms of the Treaty of Moscow, Russia accorded to Lithuania only those territories with a preponderant Lithuanian and Semitic population, leaving for a separate settlement with either Poland or a sovietized White Russia the question of the territories farther east. In agreeing to this settlement, Lithuania, like Latvia, abandoned claims to regions farther east which had been historically and ethnographically Lithuanian, but which, in the period since the First Partition (1772), had become predominantly White Russian. It acquired only White Russian minorities which are Catholic in religion, leaving outside its territory large numbers of White Russians of Orthodox belief. The final factor to be noted in connection with the eastern boundary is that the Moscow settlement gave to Lithuania, as a basic weapon for its own protection, the important strategic railway from Gardinas (Grodno) through Vilna to Dvinsk.

LOSS OF VILNIUS AND THE CORRIDOR

The settlement at Moscow, which also defined almost the whole length of the southern boundaries of Lithuania, was destined, however, to be modified by a *coup de force* during the last stages of the Russo-Polish war which deprived Lithuania of the Dvinsk corridor and incorporated it into Poland. Of this an official Polish military historian writes:⁷⁷

"The decisive factor of the plan and of the nature of the projected operations was the approaching armistice. It was not to be lost sight of that the armistice would take place along the lines attained at that moment and that these lines traced by the bayonet of the soldier would thereafter, with certain modifications, become the frontier of the Republic of Poland and Soviet Russia. From this there flowed the obligation to get possession of this or that territory, so that

75. This embraced a number of treaties and declarations of which an arbitration and conciliation treaty was particularly significant. In addition, a detailed treaty governing the settlement of all frontier questions (89 LNTS 97-126) was entered into. In a final protocol of January 29, 1928, it was noted on behalf of the Lithuanian government and acknowledged by Germany that "the frontier between Lithuania and Poland has not yet been fixed and that consequently the last point in the line marking the Lithuanian-German frontier line cannot be indicated for the present." (*loc. cit.*)

76. Cf. René Martel, *Les Blancs-Russes: étude historique, géographique, politique et économique* (Paris, 1928), and Downar-Zapolski, *Les Bases de l'Etat de la Ruthénie Blanche* (Grodno, 1919).

77. Adam Przybylski, *La Pologne en Lutte pour ses frontières, 1918-1920* (Paris, 1929), p. 164-166, 169. The account given by Przybylski, a brevet captain in the Polish army, is fully authentic, inasmuch as he was attached to the Bureau of Military History at Warsaw and had at his disposal the archives and official documents of the Ministry of Military Affairs.

the future frontier should satisfy strategic necessities. Among these necessities the Commander-in-chief regarded . . . the creation of a corridor which, on the one hand, would separate Lithuania from Russia, and, on the other hand, would permit pushing the Polish frontier up to that of Latvia. To these premises of a strategic nature, the Commander-in-chief added another of a political nature: the necessity of reconquering Wilno. The crisis of July had determined the reference of the decision relative to the allocation of Wilno to the League of Nations. The Commander-in-chief resolved in consequence to confront—as he had already done in 1919—the solution with an accomplished fact. . . . The action on Wilno, in order not to place the Polish Government in a difficult position, was not to be undertaken as an action prescribed by the Polish command, but as a spontaneous act of the group of General Zeligowski. After having occupied Wilno, General Zeligowski extended the area in his possession to the west and north and finally attained the general line which, before the July retreat, constituted the line of demarcation of the Polish and Lithuanian troops. . . . A decision of the Conference of Ambassadors on March 15, 1923, made in execution of the Treaty of Versailles, recognized as the frontier of Poland and Russia the line traced by the Russo-Polish treaty of peace of March 18, 1921, and as the frontier of Poland and Lithuania a line virtually identic with that previously accepted by the armistice of 1920. This decision, in short, did nothing but register the *de jure* recognition of the fact already accomplished by Poland.”

In consequence of the accomplished facts of Polish aggression, which the machinery of the League of Nations proved powerless to change and the Conference of Ambassadors merely legitimated,⁷⁸ a condition of legal war, marked by non-intercourse, the absence of diplomatic relations and the absolute closure of the “frontier,” existed between Lithuania and Poland down to December 1927. The effort of the Council of the League of Nations by a resolution of December 12, 1927 formally to declare the state of war at an end⁷⁹ accomplished little more than to ascertain that in the given situation, and in the light of the disparity of military effectives, Lithuania was not ready to convert smoldering hostility into an open war which, if an

isolated action, could end only in the extinction of Lithuanian independence. The efforts subsequently made to liquidate the controversy by direct negotiation failed completely, owing to the unwillingness of the Polish government to admit responsibility for the Zeligowski coup and make territorial restorations, and to the refusal of the Lithuanian government to sign a non-aggression pact with Poland on the basis of the territorial *status quo*.⁸⁰ After eleven years of futile negotiation, the status of the Vilnius territory, despite every endeavor at pacific solution, remains as it was left by the *fait accompli* of October 10, 1920. A decade of the strategy of politics has been unable to compensate for a day of the politics of strategy.

EXISTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Some elements in the situation have, however, changed. Both Poland and Lithuania are bound juridically by the stipulations of the Kellogg Pact. The absence of enforcement machinery under the pact, however, makes the possibility of its efficacy in a given *casus foederis* remote. The overlapping territorial claims of the two countries might well lead to action under the caption of self-defense, reserved specifically in the understandings which preceded the conclusion of the Pact. It is primarily the fact that the unsanctioned stipulations of the Kellogg Pact are made directly applicable as between Russia and its immediate neighbors by the terms of the Litvinov Protocol that tends to preclude a policy of direct action by Lithuania and Poland. Moreover, the fact that Russia, in signing a non-aggression and neutrality pact with Lithuania in 1926, and in renewing it indefinitely in 1931,⁸¹ explicitly reaffirmed the violated frontiers of the Treaty of Moscow, imposes upon Poland a measure of caution which is not lightly to be laid aside, irrespective of the juridical status of the Treaty of Moscow.

In Lithuania's territorial relations with Poland are to be found the main elements of

78. Cf. the Lithuanian Yellowbook, *Documents Diplomatiques: Conflit Polono-Lithuanien, Question de Vilna, 1918-1924* (Kaunas, 1924.) As to the legal validity of this decision and its binding force on Lithuania, cf. the *Consultations de MM. A. de Lapradelle, Louis Le Fur et André N. Mandelstam concernant la force obligatoire de la décision de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs du 15 mars 1923* (Paris, 1928).

79. Cf. *Official Journal of the League of Nations*, Ninth Year (1928), p. 176 (Annex XI).

80. Cf. the Polish publication, *Documents diplomatiques: Relations polono-lithuaniennes, Conférence de Koenigsberg* (Warsaw, 1928). Document No. 19, Zaleski to Voldemaras. Cf. the résumé of the Koenigsberg discussions and the draft Lithuanian non-aggression treaty in the Lithuanian Telegraph Agency Economic and General Bulletin, No. 10, August 1928, p. 1-13.

81. Cf. *Izvestia*, May 7, 1931.

its insecurity; security, for Lithuania, rests primarily upon understanding with Russia, based on the treaty of peace, supplemented by the non-aggression pact of 1926 which has prospects of indefinite duration. These are reinforced by the Kellogg Pact and the Litvinov Protocol. Lithuania is aware that, in a realistic world, its independence and security from Polish aggression are more adequately safeguarded by Moscow than by

Geneva, and this fundamental conception conditions its entire foreign policy, although it is problematic whether Soviet Russia would, during its economic renovation, incur the risk of actual hostilities in supporting Lithuania. In inter-Baltic affairs Lithuania's policy is largely in consonance with that of its northern neighbors and emphasizes cooperative action and peaceful understanding.⁸²

POLAND

TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENTS

The promise to create following the World War a united Poland, made up of all regions indisputably Polish in character and assured free and secure access to the sea, was almost universally regarded as an act of historic justice to a four-times partitioned nation. As eventually realized, the extent of the Polish Republic went territorially far beyond the bounds of the Wilsonian formula. The Treaty of Versailles gave Poland on the west an ethnographic boundary closely corresponding to that of pre-partition days, while the "certain frontiers" treaty of August 10, 1920⁸³ allocated to it practically the whole of former Austrian Poland including integrally Eastern Galicia, with its preponderantly Ukrainian population. The eastern boundaries of Poland were not defined by the Peace Conference of Paris, owing in part to the continuance of military operations in the region and in part to the fact that the conference had no legal mandate to dispose of territory other than that belonging to the defeated central powers. The conference indicated to the Polish government, however, by the well-known Curzon Line, the areas which, in the opinion of the major Allied powers, could be included in the Polish state on the basis of ethnographic affiliation. The regions lying east of this

line were regarded as at least dubiously Polish, and as likely to be contested by other states emerging from the ruins of the Russian Empire. In the final determination of Poland's boundaries with Russia, ethnographic considerations played little or no part. After the near-disaster of the Russo-Polish war, conceptions of a military character outweighed all political factors and the principal strategic positions occupied between the Dvina and the Dniester became, in due season, the acknowledged political frontier. Judged from the point of view of defensibility, the eastern boundaries of Poland are probably as "secure," given a highly difficult terrain, as any that could have been devised; viewed from the standpoint of either ethnography or international relations, the "eastern confines" are a distinct liability, as they cut clearly across the lines of nationality in at least three areas, and include numerous elements whose ethnic affiliation and political allegiance lie primarily with their kinsmen in Soviet Ukraine, Soviet White Russia and Lithuania.

WESTERN AND SOUTHERN BOUNDARIES

The problem of security⁸⁴ does not arise for Poland on the west from the mere fact of adjacency to Germany; owing to the disarmament of the Reich, the menace is not basically military. It is the failure of Germany and Poland to arrive at a fundamental political understanding and the persistence of a treaty revisionism oblivious of all ethnographic considerations which imperil peace and preclude security along this particular frontier. Not even the Locarno settlement⁸⁵ implied the renunciation of territorial claims by the Reich: it merely connoted the re-

82. Lithuania has no arbitration or conciliation treaties with either Finland or Estonia. Its arbitration convention of November 25, 1930 with Latvia was noted (cf. p. 447, footnote 70) as partially bridging the hitherto existing gap in the facilities for inter-Baltic settlement. In addition, Lithuania has entered into a treaty of conciliation with Sweden (56 LNTS 191) and with the United States (100 LNTS 111), conciliation and arbitration conventions with Denmark (67 LNTS 333) and Germany (90 LNTS 233), and a convention on conciliation and judicial settlement with Italy (76 LNTS 439). There is also a separate arbitration convention with the United States (100 LNTS 117). According to Article 5 of the non-aggression treaty with Russia the contracting parties agreed to appoint conciliation commissions to liquidate potential controversies. This was to be determined by a special agreement which has not as yet been consummated. Lithuania early signed the protocol of the Permanent Court of International Justice and subsequently accepted the Optional Clause.

83. Cf. 113 *British and Foreign State Papers*, 866-872.

84. Cf. "German-Polish Relations," *Foreign Policy Association, Information Service*, Vol. III, No. 12, August 17, 1927.

85. 54 LNTS 289-359.

nunciation of warlike procedure for revision of the treaty settlement. In default of the political assurances and the guarantees against aggression which gave significance to the settlement in the west, security for the Polish state is, in this quarter, a concept devoid of real meaning. Meanwhile, due to extensive Polish colonization in the Corridor and the emigration of Germans under duress, the tides of history run ever harder against the German claim to territorial restoration.

In its relations with Czechoslovakia on the south, Poland, after an initial period of misunderstanding over Teschen and Jaworzina, came to a comprehensive settlement with its neighbor which is probably as stable as any in that part of Europe and embraces adequate facilities for the adjustment of disputes.⁸⁶ In Rumania, which shares with Poland the Bukovina, inhabited by a largely Ukrainian population, Warsaw has found a convenient and complacent ally,⁸⁷ particularly as the insecurity of their respective eastern frontiers and the fact of common alliance with France⁸⁸ created a community of feeling transcending racial and linguistic differences and serving to coordinate foreign and military policy.

THE EASTERN BOUNDARY

On its eastern frontier, which is so much at variance with ethnographic realities, Poland finds its security at low ebb. Leaving aside the conceptions of cultural mission which here, as in Finland, dictate a vigorously anti-Communist policy, it is the fact of the persistent clash of Polish and non-Polish nationalities, with the former possessing all the advantages accruing from the virtual monopoly of governmental power, that lies at the heart of the security problem. It is the failure at Warsaw to appreciate the disruptive force of suppressed nationality which weakens the whole Polish position. In the existing Polish Republic there is not adequate leeway for the development of Lithuanian, White Russian and Ukrainian nationality, hence the problem is far from be-

ing constitutionalized. It therefore persists, in a form half international, half domestic in character, and incapable of integral solution because of its inherently dualistic aspect.

The problem is not, however, equally grave in the case of all three nationalities. The White Russian movement is and will probably remain for a considerable time primarily cultural and not political in character. Here a tolerant policy and the extension of a wide autonomy, despite the allurements of adjacency to Soviet White Russia, would appear to be the practical solvents of the problem, without impairing the administrative unity of the Polish state. However, the decade of delay in implementing the scheme of local government promised in the constitution of 1921 would seem to establish a presumption against any early grant of substantial autonomy. The same considerations involved in the case of White Russian minorities would apply to those of Lithuanian nationality in the event of the return of Vilna and a territorial restoration approximating that legally accorded Lithuania in its peace with Russia.

THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM

The situation with regard to the Ukrainian population is by no means so simple. The Ukrainian group, numerically far exceeding any other single minority, has proved most restive under Polish rule and has been in intermittent rebellion ever since its incorporation, its loyalty, from the standpoint of Polish officialdom, having been purely formal and without substance. Repressive measures have been the order of the day among the Polish administrators, and a type of guerrilla warfare, not without outside support, has for some time existed between Ukrainian military and allegedly "terroristic" organizations and the Polish political police. This assumed such serious proportions in the summer and autumn of 1930 that it practically amounted to civil war, calling for the most energetic measures of "pacification."⁸⁹ Following a partial restoration of Polish authority early in 1931,

86. 48 LNTS 333.

87. The original alliance of March 3, 1921 is found in 7 LNTS 78; it was replaced in 1926 by a treaty of guarantee (60 LNTS 161) which was integrally renewed on January 15, 1931 (*Messenger Polonais*, No. 1792, January 16, 1931, p. 1, c. 1), except that the provisions for denunciation were modified to require one year's notice in lieu of six months.

88. For the text of the Franco-Polish Alliance of February 19, 1921, cf. 18 LNTS 12; for the Franco-Rumanian Alliance, together with a comprehensive treaty of pacific settlement, cf. 58 LNTS 224 and 233.

89. An analysis of the measures taken, with an official justification, was given to the Polish Sejm on January 26, 1931 by General Skladkowski, Minister of the Interior. (Cf. *Messenger Polonais*, No. 1801, January 27, 1931, p. 2, c. 1-2.) The Minister is cited by a writer in *Le Monde Slave* (March 1931, p. 333), as stating that "for several weeks the Ukrainian terrorists were so powerful in Eastern Galicia that it was they, and not the Government, who held the country."

the government bloc endeavored to assist in the solution of the problem and conversations were entered into between the leading Ukrainian organizations and M. Tadeusz Holowko, formerly director of the eastern section of the Polish Foreign Office, with a view to arriving at something approximating the historic *Ausgleich* between Austria and Hungary. The past excesses of the Ukrainian "terrorists" and the harsh Polish measures of "pacification" were to be reciprocally forgiven and a new basis established for equalitarian treatment and a régime of legality as between the races.⁹⁰ As the offer on the Polish side was made contingent on the withdrawal of protests sent by the Ukrainians to the League of Nations, the refusal of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Club to withdraw the protests broke down the negotiations. The constitutional *impasse* thus reached was accentuated by the assassination of Holowko by two Ukrainian nationalist students on September 1, 1931. Meanwhile at Geneva, on May 20, 1931, the League of Nations Council's Committee of Three, after considering the Ukrainian protests, deferred a decision in principle on the matter and withdrew the item from the agenda of the Council, holding, in conformity with the Polish thesis, that "the best means of settling the problem lies in an internal agreement between the parties."⁹¹ This decision would appear to have closed the door of the international forum to any discussion of concrete measures for the adjustment of Ukrainian-Polish relations. Under the circumstances a continual crisis exists between Poland and several million people racially related to kinsmen across the Soviet frontier, thus creating a situation which leaves the bases for any political agreement enhancing security between Poland and Russia fundamentally lacking.

Security, then, is peculiarly an Eastern problem for Poland, first, because of the length of the Soviet-Polish frontier, which makes it difficult to defend; second, because of the uncertain loyalties of the allogeneous population, whose treatment at the hands of the Polish authorities has left much to

be desired, and whose military recruits are far from a positive asset; and third, because, as conceived in the Polish capital, the historic rôle of the Most Serene Republic has been cast as the defender of Catholic Christianity and the capitalist order against both the material and ideological onslaughts of communism. Because national diplomacy must rest on military and anti-national considerations and must, by its ideological and economic orientation, support the institutions of religion and the existing social and economic structure against far-reaching changes, the possibility of attaining security by political means is inordinately low.

THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY

Sufficient mention has already been made of the Vilna problem to make unnecessary a further discussion of Polish-Lithuanian security. Observers believe that basically no security worthy the name can be expected in relation to this region, despite the numerous assurances given to the League of Nations, until Poland evidences some desire for accommodation and territorial restitution. Any solution which seeks simply to ratify today the *fait accompli* of 1920 is hardly within the bounds of practicality. On the other hand, it must be conceded that measures looking toward the denationalization of Lithuanians in the Vilna area have not been without their effect and that the systematic colonization of Zeligowski's legionaries⁹² in the region has appreciably strengthened the Polish element. It is not improbable that an integral restoration of the territories taken from Lithuania would raise in an acute form the problem of treatment of Polish minorities, but this contingency obviously cannot be used as an argument for the integral maintenance of the *status quo*.

"SECONDARY DEFENSE"

Partly because of its immediate insecurity and the consequent necessity of avoiding by all reasonable means additional conflicts with other states, partly from a desire as a matter of prestige to extend its treaty commitments to as many states as possible, Poland has gone far in seeking to establish the machinery for peaceful adjustment of inter-

90. Holowko presented an account of his negotiations in the *Gazeta Polska* of March 20, 1931, and the *Messageur Polonais* of the same date (No. 1845).

91. *Messageur Polonais*, No. 1897, May 20, 1931.

92. This was first noticed on a small scale as far back as 1925. Cf. "Elta" Telegraph Agency, *Economic and General Bulletin*, No. 7, March 1925, p. 10.

national disputes, and has developed a ramified system of treaty commitments^{92a} exceeded only by those of Finland.⁹³ In a number of instances conclusion of such conventions has been accompanied by a general political understanding with the country con-

cerned, as in the cases of Austria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The Polish treaty nexus thus establishes for regions outside the tension zones of eastern Europe a "secondary defense" of impressive proportions.

CONCLUSION

Security in the Baltic area must be judged, in the last analysis, in terms of the results obtained by the national diplomacy of the component countries, particularly in defining relations with Russia, with Germany and with the rest of the Balticum. Despite abundant cooperation in limited groups, in no one respect has action been concerted or uniform on the part of all five states. There is, therefore, no common denominator to Baltic security policy, no solid bloc in support of a common program. The former fringelands of the Romanov Empire have, since attaining independence, gravitated in different directions, impelled by fundamental forces and orientations arising out of their historical backgrounds, renascent cultures, religious polarizations, and by a certain measure of geographic determinism.

Bearing in mind these divergent orientations, which have resulted in the distinctive security policies outlined in the foregoing pages, it may be well to ask in conclusion where the Baltic states now stand in relation to the determinant forces which have historically molded them; what is, from this point of view, their present measure of security. Today the *Drang nach Osten*, while temporarily arrested, is far from dead. It is safe to assume that Finland, Estonia and Latvia have escaped it, and that the historic conjuncture of circumstances which gave Germany naval paramountcy in the Baltic will not soon recur. But for both Lithuania and Poland the *Drang nach Osten* still exists. German diplomacy has kept the hands of the Reich free in the East. There has been no fundamental renunciation of

territorial ambitions, nor any positive pledge of non-aggression as regards any of the new riverains of the Baltic. Hence, although the maritime security of the new states is dependent upon the existing distribution of sea power, their territorial security is not buttressed by any specific political agreement binding Germany. The machinery for peaceful settlement exists, but the political covenant indispensable to computable security is signally wanting. As regards Russia, the situation is exactly reversed: the *Drang nach Westen*, symbolic of dynastic aggression, has stopped completely; there is no fear of resurgence of Russian naval power, and the Red Army is held back by repeated renunciatory pledges. Russia has reiterated proffered the widest type of guarantees of non-aggression accepted in varying degrees by the Baltic states, but the machinery for the liquidation of disputes is virtually non-existent. The problem is therefore only half solved. It is believed that what is basically needed in the Balticum, for the consolidation of peace in Eastern Europe, is an Eastern Locarno which should obtain from Germany and Russia the requisite territorial guarantees and establish an effective machinery of settlement. Only such an arrangement can complete diplomatically the process begun with independence, and safeguard more effectively than is now possible from Geneva the achieved status of the Baltic republics in the European community of nations.

92a. Following closely the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish pact, Poland and the Soviet Union signed at Moscow on January 25, 1932 a non-aggression treaty renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and pledging the signatories to refrain from direct or indirect aggression under all circumstances. Rights of both signatories under the Kellogg Pact and other non-aggression agreements were specifically reserved. The treaty stipulated, however, that an attack on a third power by one signatory would entitle the other signatory to abrogate the agreement. (Cf. *New York Herald Tribune*, January 26, 1932.)

93. In addition to the Helsingfors Convention, Poland has concluded treaties of arbitration with Austria (34 LNTS 400), Germany (54 LNTS 327) and the United States (99 LNTS 407); and a separate conciliation convention with the United States only (99 LNTS 401). It has treaties of arbitration and conciliation with Czechoslovakia (48 LNTS 383), Switzerland (50 LNTS 261), Denmark (61 LNTS 245), Sweden (62 LNTS 263), Austria (62 LNTS 329), Yugoslavia (78 LNTS 419), Hungary (100 LNTS 67), Rumania (100 LNTS 299), and the Netherlands (25 *American Journal of International Law* 354). Finally it has entered into conventions of conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement with Norway (101 LNTS 325) and Spain (101 LNTS 501). On January 24, 1931, Poland signed the Optional Clause of the Protocol of the Permanent Court of International Justice, reserving from its scope, however, any matters arising out of the World War and the Russo-Polish War. (*Messageur Polonais*, No. 1809, February 6, 1931.)